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Abstract 
An anchoring adjusted currency option pricing formula is developed in which the risk of the 
underlying currency is used as a starting point which gets adjusted upwards to arrive at the currency 
call risk. Anchoring bias implies that such adjustments are insufficient. The new formula converges 
to the Garman-Kohlhagen formula in the absence of anchoring bias. Anchoring bias generates the 
implied volatility smile if investors hold heterogeneous exchange rate expectations. 
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1
 An earlier version was circulated with the title, “Analogy based valuation of currency options”. 
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Explaining the Smile in Currency Options: Is it Anchoring? 
 
Arguably, the most popular currency option pricing model among traders is the Garman-Kohlhagen 
model, which is the Black Scholes model (see Black and Scholes (1973)) suitably modified for 
currency options (See Garman and Kohlhagen (1983)). The existence of the implied volatility smile 
in currency options is inconsistent with the model. If the model is correct then implied volatility 
should not vary with strike, however, at-the-money currency options typically have lower implied 
volatility than in-the-money and out-of-the-money options (see Derman (2003)). 
The Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen model assumes that markets are informationally 
efficient in the sense that risk adjusted return from a currency option is equal to the risk adjusted 
return from the underlying currency itself. A pre-requisite for informational efficiency is that all risks 
are correctly perceived. However, risk is a highly subjective notion, and the argument that risks are 
often misperceived in significant ways even when stakes are high is frequently made. See Rotheli 
(2010), Bhattacharya, Goldman, & Sood (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), and Barberis & Thaler 
(2002) among many others. 
How does one form risk judgments about currency call options? A currency call option’s 
payoffs move in the same direction as the movement in the underlying currency; however, as it is a 
leveraged position in the underlying currency, it is clearly riskier. Hence, it is reasonable to start with 
the risk of the underlying currency and add to it to arrive at a risk judgment regarding a currency call 
option.  However, using the risk of the underlying currency as a starting point to form risk 
judgments regarding currency call options exposes one to the anchoring bias.  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974) in their experiments noted that adjustments from an initial value are typically 
insufficient as people tend to stop after they reach a plausible value starting from some initial value. 
Hence, estimates remain at the boundary of plausible values near the initial value known as the 
anchor. For a survey of recent research on anchoring, see Furnham and Boo (2011).   
As argued in Shiller (1999), anchoring appears to be an important concept for financial 
markets. Hirshelifer (2001) considers anchoring to be an “important part of psychology based dynamic asset 
pricing theory in its infancy” (p. 1535). Empirical evidence suggests that experienced professionals show 
economically and statistically significant anchoring bias in forming stock return estimates (see 
Kausta, Alho, and Pultanen (2008)). Anchoring has been found to matter in the bank loan market as 
the current spread paid by a firm seems to be anchored to the credit spread the firm had paid earlier 
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(see Douglas, Engelberg, Parsons, and Van Wesep (2015)). The role of anchoring bias has been 
found to be important in equity markets in how analysts forecast firms’ earnings (see Cen, Hillary, 
and Wei (2013)). Also, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) find that expert consensus forecasts of monthly 
economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Johnson 
and Schnytzer (2009) show that investors in a particular financial market (horse-race betting) are 
prone to the anchoring bias. 
Given the importance of this bias for financial markets in general, and the presence of this 
bias in experienced professionals in particular when they form stock return estimates (see Kausta et 
al (2008)), it is logical to expect that such a bias also exists in call return estimates. This becomes 
even more compelling when one realizes that a clear starting point exists for call options, which is 
the underlying stock. In fact, considerable field and experimental evidence suggests that such a bias 
matters for call options. Market professionals with decades of experience often argue that a call 
option is a surrogate for the underlying stock.2 Such opinions are surely indicative of the importance 
of the underlying stock risk as a starting point for thinking about a call option risk, and point to 
insufficient adjustment to perceived risk, which creates room for the surrogacy argument. 
Furthermore, a series of laboratory experiments (see Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2012), and Siddiqi 
(2011) show that the hypothesis that a call option is priced by equating its expected return to the 
expected return from the underlying stock outperforms other pricing hypotheses.  The results are 
consistent with the idea that risk of the underlying stock is used as a starting point with the 
anchoring heuristic ensuring that adjustments to the stock risk to arrive at call risk are insufficient. 
Hence, expected call returns do not deviate from expected underlying stock returns as much as they 
should.  
Siddiqi (2015) puts forward an anchoring adjusted option pricing formula for equity options 
and shows that it provides a unified explanation for a number of option pricing puzzles. In this 
article, I extend the argument in Siddiqi (2015) to currency options. In this article, I show that if the 
risk of the underlying currency is used as a starting point to form a risk judgment about the 
                                                          
2
 As illustrative examples, see the following: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/stock-replacement-strategy-reduce-risk-142949569.html 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, 
http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/ 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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corresponding call option and anchoring bias leads to insufficient adjustment, then a new option 
pricing formula arises. The new formula converges to the Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen 
formula if there is no anchoring bias. If the prices are determined in accordance with the new 
formula, and the Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen formula is used to back out implied volatility, 
then the smile may arise if exchange rate expectations are heterogeneous. Hence, anchoring provides 
a potential explanation for the smile in currency options. 
The central prediction of asset pricing theory is: 
         
 
           
                                (0.1) 
Where    and    denote the (gross) return on a risky asset and the return on the risk free asset 
respectively. Equation (0.1) shows that the return that a subjective expected utility maximizer 
expects from a risky asset depends on his belief about the covariance of the asset’s return with his 
marginal utility of consumption.  
 According to (0.1), an investor is required to form a judgment about the covariance of an 
asset’s return with his marginal utility of consumption. It is reasonable to think that instead of 
forming such judgments in isolation for each asset, such a judgment is formed for a familiar asset 
and then extrapolated to another similar asset. A currency call option derives its existence from the 
underlying currency, and their payoffs are strongly related and move together.  
With the above in mind, an analogy maker is defined as a subjective expected utility maximizer who 
uses the risk of the underlying currency as a reference point for forming risk judgments about the corresponding currency 
call option.  That is, an analogy maker assesses call risk in comparison with the underlying currency 
risk. If one forms a judgment about call option risk in comparison with his judgment about the 
underlying currency risk, then one may write: 
    
        
           
         
        
           
                                                                        (0.2) 
Where    and    are call and currency returns respectively, and   is the adjustment used to arrive at 
call option risk from the underlying stock risk. Almost always, assets pay more (less) when 
consumption is high (less), hence, the covariance between an asset’s return and marginal utility of 
consumption is negative. That is, I assume that                   . So, in order to make a call 
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option at least as risky as the underlying currency, I assume    . An analogy maker understands 
that a call option is a leveraged position in the underlying currency, hence is riskier. However, starting from the risk of 
the underlying stock, he does not fully adjust for the risk, so he underestimates the risk of a call option. That is,    , 
which is the absolute value of risk adjustment is not large as it should be. 
In contrast, option pricing theory predicts that: 
      
        
           
           
        
           
                                                                      (0.3) 
Where     and typically takes very large values. That is, typically    . To appreciate, the 
difference between (0.3) and (0.2), note that under the Black Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen 
assumptions,    , which is call price elasticity w.r.t the underlying stock price. Ω takes very large 
values, especially for out-of-the-money call options. That is                  is likely to be a far 
bigger negative number with correct risk judgment than with analogy making. Hence, a comparison 
of (0.2) and (0.3) indicates that, with analogy making, one likely remains anchored to the risk of the 
underlying currency while forming risk judgments about the call option leading to underestimation 
of its risk.  
 Substituting (0.2) in (0.1) leads to: 
                                                                                                                            (0.4) 
In contrast, substituting (0.3) in (0.1) under the Black Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen assumptions 
yields: 
                                                                                                                (0.5) 
    and typically takes very large values. Hence, expected call return is likely to be smaller under 
analogy making when compared with the Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen predictions. 
 Clearly, an analogy maker over-prices a call option. Can rational investors make arbitrage 
profits against such analogy makers? There are three reasons which make such arbitraging very 
difficult if not impossible. Firstly, the presence of large transaction costs (currency options are 
mostly OTC instruments with large bid-ask spreads) in currency options create a significant hurdle 
for anyone interested in profiting from selling over-priced options and buying replicating portfolios. 
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Secondly, to a credit constrained seller, selling an over-priced option creates bankruptcy risk whereas 
buying an option does not create such a risk. The reason is that buying an option confers a right to 
the buyer without creating an obligation, whereas selling an option creates an obligation. In case of a 
strong adverse movement, a credit constrained seller may get bankrupt. Finally, a replicating 
portfolio may not even exist, for example, when the underlying currency follows jump diffusion or 
stochastic volatility.  In this article, I assume geometric Brownian motion for simplicity; however, it 
is easy to extend the argument to more general processes such as jump diffusion and/or stochastic 
volatility. 
  
1. Analogy Making and the Value of Currency Options 
Suppose the marginal investor in a currency call option with a strike of   is an analogy maker. If   
denotes the domestic currency price of a call option on one unit of foreign currency,   is the 
expected percentage appreciation in the domestic currency price of foreign currency, and    is the 
foreign interest rate on a risk free bond, then over a time interval   : 
     
 
 
     
 
                                                                                                     (1.1) 
That is, the expected return from holding the foreign currency is    the drift of the exchange rate 
(domestic units per foreign unit), plus risk free interest rate earned from holding the foreign 
currency in a risk free asset such as foreign treasury notes. An analogy maker adds the adjustment 
term      to the return from holding the underlying currency to arrive at the return he expects from 
a currency call option. As a higher strike call is riskier than a lower strike call,      rises with strike. 
 All the assumptions of the Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen model are maintained except 
for two assumptions. Firstly, I allow for (proportional and symmetric) transaction costs, whereas the 
Black- Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen model requires that transaction costs must be zero. Secondly, I 
assume that there is anchoring bias implying that the adjustment to the underlying currency return 
(risk) to arrive at the currency call return (risk) is insufficient. If   is the percentage transaction cost, 
then (1.1) can be re-written as: 
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                                                                                                      (1.2) 
As in the Black-Scholes/Garman Kohlhagen model, I assume that the spot exchange rate 
(domestic units per foreign unit) follows geometric Brownian motion with drift   and standard 
deviation equal to  : 
                                                                                                                        (1.3) 
Equations (1.2) and (1.3) are sufficient to arrive at a partial differential equation (PDE) that a 
currency call option must satisfy under analogy making. The associated PDE is described in 
proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 If analogy making determines the price of a European currency call option in 
the presence of transaction costs, then its price must satisfy the following PDE: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                 (1.4) 
With the boundary condition that at expiry, which is at time  , the value of a European call 
option with a strike of   is given by:              
Proof. 
See Appendix A. 
▄ 
 
It is interesting to note that (1.4) is equal to the Garman-Kohlhagen PDE/Black Scholes PDE for 
currency options if the adjustment is correct, and there are no transaction costs. To see this clearly, 
note that the correct adjustment to underlying currency return (risk) for estimating currency call 
return (risk) when       is: 
                                                                                                                      (1.5) 
Where    is call price elasticity w.r.t the underlying currency exchange rate. That is,    
 
 
  
  
. 
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Substituting (1.5) in (1.4) when     leads to: 
  
  
         
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                            (1.6) 
(1.6) is the Garman-Kohlhagen/Black Scholes PDE for currency call options. 
 As can be seen from (1.6), correct adjustment leads to the Garman-Kohlhagen/Black-
Scholes PDE for currency call options. However, the presence of anchoring bias     
                 and transaction costs imply that the PDE to solve is given in (1.4). 
 A special case is the situation where the marginal investor is risk neutral with zero 
transaction costs. With risk neutrality, it follows that        . It is easy to see that risk neutrality 
also makes analogy PDE equal to Garman-Kohlhagen PDE (1.4 is equal to 1.6).  
 It is clear that 1.4 becomes equal to 1.6 in two cases: 1) Risk aversion with correct 
adjustment, and 2) Risk neutrality. Hence, risk aversion with incorrect adjustment, that is, risk 
aversion with the anchoring bias creates a divergence between the analogy PDE and the Garman-
Kohlhagen PDE. 
By using a similar method to what is used in solving the Black-Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen 
PDE, the analogy based PDE given in (1.4) can be solved to recover an option pricing formula for a 
currency call option under analogy making. Proposition 2 presents the formula. By using put-call 
parity, the price of a currency put option is also obtained. 
 
Proposition 2 If analogy making determines the price of a currency call option in the 
presence of transaction costs, then the corresponding European call option pricing formula 
is: 
                                 
                                                                      (1.7) 
Where    
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 and    
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 
Proof. 
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See Appendix B. 
▄ 
Corollary 2.1 The price of a corresponding European put option under analogy making is 
given by: 
  
                                               
                                      
            (1.8)   
Proof. 
Follows from put-call parity for exchange rate options. 
▄ 
 
Next, I show that if option prices are determined in accordance with the analogy formula, and the 
Garman-Kohlhagen/Black-Scholes formula is used to back-out implied volatility, the smile may 
arise with heterogeneous expectations. 
 
2. The Implied Volatility Smile 
 An analogy maker uses the return (risk) of the underlying currency as a starting point to form his 
judgment about the return (risk) of the currency call option, with the anchoring bias leaving him 
short of the correct adjustment.  
There are two broad cases to consider: 1) Homogeneous expectations: marginal investors in 
all call options use the same starting point. It is the simplest case to analyze, however, not very 
realistic. 2) Heterogeneous expectations: marginal investors in higher strike calls use higher starting 
points. That is, marginal investors in higher strike calls are more optimistic about the return from 
the underlying currency than marginal investors in lower strike calls. This is more realistic.  
10 
 
For the purpose of illustration, the following parameter values are assumed:         
                              . These values are sufficient to price European 
currency calls with various strikes by Garman-Kohlhagen (GK) formula. The prices are shown in 
Table 1 under the heading GK. To use the analogy formula, one also needs to know   and     . For 
a given value of  , there must exist a value of     , which makes the analogy price equal to the GK 
price. By definition, that value of      is the correct adjustment needed to arrive at the correct call 
return starting from the underlying currency return. Table 1 lists the correct adjustments 
corresponding to various values of  . For example, when         
 
 
     , then the correct 
adjustment is 4.47%.  
Table 1 
K/S GK Correct      
when      
Correct      
when      
Correct      
when      
Correct      
when      
0.9 12.6116 4.47% 8.81% 13.04% 17.16% 
0.95 9.6969 5.14% 10.15% 15.04% 19.80% 
1.0 7.2910 5.85% 11.55% 17.12% 22.55% 
1.05 5.3664 6.57% 13% 19.27% 25.39% 
1.1 3.8715 7.31% 14.46% 21.45% 28.28% 
 
As Table 1 shows, if investors use correct adjustments, then it does not matter which formula they 
use as the analogy formula and the GK formula give the same answer. That is, if the analogy 
formula determines real world prices, and the GK formula is used to infer implied volatility, then the 
implied volatility would be 20% (correct value of  ) as long as the adjustment is correct. However, 
as the large literature on anchoring bias argues, the adjustments from a starting point are usually 
insufficient. What happens with insufficient adjustment? For the purpose of illustration, I assume 
that adjustments are always 50% of the correct adjustment. That is, from a given starting point, 
investors only reach half-way to the correct adjustment. Table 2 shows the values of implied 
volatility with the assumed half-way adjustment. 
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Table 2 
Implied Volatility with Anchoring Bias 
K/S 
            
            
 
 
     
            
            
 
 
     
           
 
            
 
 
     
           
 
            
 
 
     
0.9 20.86367% 21.71874% 22.56226% 23.39497% 
0.95 20.68371% 21.36648% 22.04672% 22.72570% 
1.0 20.55946% 21.12219% 21.68592% 22.25136% 
1.05 20.47190% 20.94630% 21.42449% 21.90536% 
1.1 20.40684% 20.81708% 21.23064% 21.64701% 
 
Table 2 shows that the implied volatility falls monotonically with strike if expectations are 
homogeneous.  
 As discussed earlier, assuming that expectations are homogeneous is not very realistic. It is 
likely that more optimistic investors self-select into higher strike calls. Also, note that it does not 
make much sense for an investor with a pessimistic outlook to buy a call option. After all, a call 
option is a leveraged position in the underlying currency. Buying a currency call with a pessimistic 
outlook is equivalent to intentionally magnifying one’s losses. That is, one must at least have a 
neutral outlook about the underlying currency if he buys a currency call option.  So, it makes sense 
to argue that investors self-select with neutral to moderately bullish investors selecting low strike 
calls, and strongly bullish buying higher strike calls. As an illustration of this point, continuing with 
the example presented in Table 2, I assume that      when 
 
 
 is 0.90, 0.95, and 1.0 (neutral), 
     when 
 
  
 is 1.05 (moderately bullish), and      when 
 
 
 is 1.1 (strongly bullish). Figure 1 
is a graphical illustration of the resulting smile. 
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Figure 1 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the anchoring bias with heterogeneous expectations may give rise to implied 
volatility smile.  If the anchoring approach is correct, then the degree of heterogeneity or belief 
dispersion must have a direct impact on the structure of the smile. One would expect greater belief 
dispersion to increase the curvature of the smile. This is consistent with empirical evidence that 
heterogeneous exchange rate beliefs are an important determinant of the shape of the implied 
volatility smile, and greater belief dispersion increases the curvature of the smile (see Beber, A., 
Buraschi, A., and Breedon, F. (2010)). 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
For the purpose of hedging risks arising from currency option exposure, partial derivatives of (1.7) 
and (1.8) are of special interest with ‘hedge ratio’ being of prime importance: 
  
  
                                                                                                                  (3.1) 
0.205 
0.206 
0.207 
0.208 
0.209 
0.21 
0.211 
0.212 
0.213 
0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 
Implied Volatility 
K/S 
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Getting the hedge ratio right is of key importance to currency option traders, and they are potentially 
exposed to large losses without it. 
 Some other partial derivatives are: 
  
  
                                                                                                             (3.2) 
  
  
                                                                                                       (3.3) 
  
   
                                                                                                                                      (3.4) 
  
   
                                         
                                   (3.5) 
To a speculator interested in taking directional bets on exchange rates, these partial 
derivatives are important as they constitute the risk constraints in a linear programming problem.3 If 
prices are determined in accordance with the analogy formula, and Garman-Kohlhagen formula is 
used to estimate these partial derivatives, quite a few additional problems arise apart from getting the 
hedge ratio wrong as mentioned earlier.  
Firstly, exchange rate expectations have no direct impact in Garman-Kohlhagen setting 
beyond their impact on spot rate, whereas under analogy making, an increase in expected 
appreciation directly increases the value of currency call options as (3.3) shows, over and above any 
indirect impact on the spot rate. 
Secondly, in sharp contrast with Garman-Kohlhagen formula, an increase in domestic 
interest rate does not directly affect the call price. Of course, there are indirect effects due to impacts 
on exchange rate expectations and the spot rate. An increase in foreign interest rates has a negative 
impact on call price in Garman-Kohlhagen formula, whereas the impact is ambiguous under analogy 
making, and can be positive for out-of-the-money call options. 
Last but not the least, the presence of transaction costs dampens the magnitude of nearly all 
partial derivatives.  
                                                          
3
 See Rendlemen (2002) (Chapter 7) for details on setting up linear programming problems associated with 
directional bets. 
14 
 
The partial derivatives of put option are similarly obtained from (1.8) and they have opposite 
signs. 
 
4. Conclusions 
People choose which options to buy based on subjective reasons. This fact compels one to think 
that investor expectations matter for option demands and prices. Indeed, Bollen and Whaley (2004) 
find that demand pressures associated with various option series matter for implied volatility.  
However, theoretical option pricing models typically do not have any role for investor expectations, 
even though they provide an elegant framework of analysis. It seems that the challenge is to 
incorporate investor expectations in the elegant option pricing framework with the goal of 
increasing its explanatory power. The idea of analogy making provides a tool to do just that.  
 As discussed in the introduction, analogy making approach is inspired by experienced market 
professionals, who consider the underlying instrument risk to be a starting point for forming risk 
judgments about corresponding call options. An analogy maker is a subjective expected utility 
maximize who uses the risk of the underlying instrument as a starting point to which he adds to, 
with an objective of forming risk judgments regarding corresponding call options. Anchoring bias 
implies that such adjustments are insufficient. 
In this article, the approach is extended to currency options. The approach leads to an 
analogy based currency option pricing formula which contains the Garman-Kohlhagen formula as a 
special case corresponding to the absence of the anchoring bias. With anchoring bias, the implied 
volatility smile may arise. 
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Appendix A 
     
 
                                                                                                              (A1) 
From Ito’s Lemma: 
       
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                       (A2) 
Substituting (A2) in (A1) and simplifying leads to: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                 (A3) 
(A3) is the analogy based PDE for a currency call option with the boundary condition: 
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Appendix B 
Start by making the following transformations in (A3): 
  
  
 
      
    
 
 
        
                        
 
 
  
  
 
       
It follows, 
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
  
 
   
   
   
 
  
  
  
 
Plugging the above transformations into (A3) and writing    
    
  
,    
   
  
, and    
          
  
we 
get: 
  
  
 
   
   
       
  
  
                                                                                                          
With the boundary condition/initial condition: 
                                             
To eliminate the last two terms in (B1), an additional transformation is made: 
                    
It follows, 
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Substituting the above transformations in (B1), we get: 
  
  
 
   
   
                                       
  
  
                              (B2) 
Choose    
     
 
 and    
      
 
        . (B2) simplifies to the Heat equation: 
  
  
 
   
   
                                                                                                                                                         
With the initial condition: 
              
                         
   
       
   
         
The solution to the Heat equation in our case is: 
       
 
    
   
      
 
  
 
  
           
Change variables: 
    
   
 , which means:    
   
   
. Also, from the boundary condition, we know 
that             .  Hence, we can restrict the integration range to   
  
   
 
       
 
   
   
  
    
   
  
           
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
  
           
        
Complete the squares for the exponent in   : 
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We can see that       and   does not depend on  . Hence, we can write: 
   
  
   
   
  
   
 
  
   
   
 
       
 
A normally distributed random variable has the following cumulative distribution function: 
     
 
   
   
  
   
 
  
 
Hence,    
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Similarly,      
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The analogy based European currency call pricing formula is obtained by recovering original 
variables: 
                            
                
Where    
           
  
 
      
     
        
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 
 
